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Abstract
Concern over illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has led to a number
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on small-scale fisheries is conspicuously lacking from the policy and research de-
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bate. In this paper, we outline three ways in which the application of IUU discourse

5

of “illegal,” “unreported” and “unregulated” fishing, and also the categorical use of
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the impact of IUU regulation on industrial fleets, recognition of the distinct impacts

and regulation undermines small-scale fisheries. First, the mainstream construction
“IUU” in an all-inclusive sense, disregards the diversity, legitimacy and sustainability
of small-scale fisheries practices and their governing systems. Second, we explore
how the recent trade-related measures to counter IUU fishing mask and reinforce
existing inequalities between different sectors and countries, creating an unfair burden on small-scale fisheries and countries who depend on them. Third, as IUU fishing is increasingly approached as “organized crime,” there is a risk of inappropriately
targeting small-scale fisheries, at times violently. Reflecting on these three trends,
we propose three strategies by which a more sensitive and ultimately more equitable
incorporation of small-scale fisheries can be supported in the global fight against IUU
fishing.
KEYWORDS

catch certification, developing countries, fisheries governance, maritime security, organized
crime, seafood trade
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“Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud” (dated 17 June 2014) with

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is attributed as

the aim of establishing reporting procedures for importation of

a major cause of overfishing around the world. Annual IUU land-

“at-risk” fish (NOAA, 2019). In 2018, this framework transformed

ings are estimated at 26 million tons globally, equivalent to one-

into the mandatory Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP),

in-five wild-caught fish, with a net annual cost of between $10

implemented under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation

and $23 billion (Agnew et al., 2009; Pew Trusts, 2018; Sumaila,

and Management Act, with the aim of ensuring transparency for

Alder, & Keith, 2006). Faced with the scale of these figures, re-

13 seafood species vulnerable to IUU and/or mislabelling seafood

gional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) and intergov-

(see NOAA, 2019). Under SIMP, there are provisions for individual

ernmental organizations—now increasingly joined by a broad range

exporting firms to gain “trusted trader” status, if they can estab-

of NGOs and individual states—see the elimination of IUU fishing

lish and verify their supply chain is free of IUU fish or fish product

as essential to securing sustainable fishery resources into the fu-

and falsely labelled seafood product (NOAA, 2018). Those with

ture (e.g. Cabral et al., 2018; Erceg, 2006; FAO, 2001a, 2001b;

this status can benefit from reduced reporting and recordkeeping

Flothmann et al., 2010; Pitcher, Watson, Forrest, Valtýsson, &

requirements. Unlike the EU-IUU regulation, the US-SIMP does

Guénette, 2002).

not implement country-level exclusion from the US market as a

Early impetus for addressing IUU fishing came from the

result of non-compliance. But small-scale fisheries remain vulner-

United Nations (UN), which at the turn of the century (from

able to the increased information requirements demanded under

1999 to 2000) declared it as “one of the most severe problems

US-SIMP—which increases their dependency on their buyers or

affecting world fisheries” (UNGA, 1999). This led to the Food and

“third parties” to support documentation and traceability (see

Agriculture Organization's (FAO) International Plan of Action to

Djelantik, 2016; He, 2018). Amid recent calls to expand these

Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated

forceful trade measures to other major importing countries, such

Fishing (IPOA-IUU) in 2001 (FAO, 2001a). Over time, the UN

as Japan and China (Sumaila, 2019), this article uses the lon-

has expanded its IUU framework through the 2009 Port State

ger-running and more widely discussed EU policy as an illustra-

Measures Agreement (entered into force in 2016) aimed at reg-

tion of the wider shift to trade-restrictive IUU regulation.

ulating landings and transshipment of fish from foreign-flagged

While the breadth of IUU fishing countermeasures is impressive,

vessels (Pew Trusts, 2018). RFMOs, most of which fall under the

we argue that they have a strong tendency to homogenize fishing

remit of the UN’s Law of the Sea, have also gradually addressed

activity either by the country in which they operate, by the export

IUU fishing in transboundary waters through a range of monitor-

species they target or by the sector they encapsulate. Categorical

ing, control and surveillance (MCS) measures, albeit with varying

assumptions of what IUU is and how it should be “fought” hold sig-

effectiveness (e.g. Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, 2010; Haas, Haward,

nificant consequences for small-scale fisheries (SSF), a sector that

McGee, & Fleming, 2019). IUU fishing is also taken up under the

includes 86 per cent of motorized fishing vessels (corresponding

UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14, which further ex-

to 12 m in length or less), 90 per cent of the fisheries workforce

horts countries to improve coastal state controls, and national

and two-thirds of catches destined for direct human consumption

legal frameworks (see Haas, Fleming, Haward, & McGee, 2019).

globally (FAO, 2018). By their very nature, small-scale fisheries do

Meanwhile, international trade-based measures have evolved

not commonly fall under reporting regimes or government regula-

over time to augment traditional MCS approaches to IUU

tory frameworks aimed at industrial and other large-scale fisher-

(He, 2017; Stokke, 2009). Both unilateral and multilateral trade-

ies. Yet, because IUU fishing is frequently interpreted and applied

based measures have been put in place, including cargo docu-

without distinguishing the particularities of small-scale fisheries (see

mentation, voluntary vessel registries, country report cards and

Drammeh, 2001; Isaacs & Witbooi, 2019; Luomba, Chuenpagdee, &

private consumer-directed product labelling schemes (see Helyar

Song, 2016 for exceptions), the wide range of countermeasures out-

et al., 2014; Le Gallic & Cox, 2006; Stokke, 2009). Most notably,

lined above risk undermining not only the well-being of small-scale

overt trade-restrictive measures have been implemented by major

fishers (including achievement of SDGs 1 and 2 aimed at poverty

seafood markets such as the European Union (EU) and United

elimination and food security) but also the ability of the measures to

States (US). The EU-IUU regulation restricts or blocks imports

be legitimate and effective in the long run (Berkes & Nayak, 2018;

if exporting countries do not show significant efforts to address

Coulthard, Johnson, & McGregor, 2011).

IUU activity in their waters or by vessels under their control (see

In this paper, we reflect on how the assumptions, terminology

Miller, Bush, & Mol, 2014; Miller & Sumaila, 2016; Soyer, Leloudas,

and regulations associated with IUU fishing have the potential to

& Miller, 2018). The US Seafood Import Monitoring Program

negatively impact small-scale fisheries. Our analysis is divided into

(SIMP) in contrast relies on an import permit system, whereby

four parts. First, we argue that the conflation of “illegal,” “unre-

catch data and documentation are requested from US-based sea-

ported” and “unregulated” into “IUU” erases the distinction between

food importers, instead of government-to-government certifica-

small-scale and industrial fleets, and also inadequately discriminates

tion (He, 2018). 1The United States (US) has implemented a similar

between the distinct illegal, unregulated and/or unreported activ-

IUU-related measure. In 2014, the US government established a

ities. Second, we review the various ways in which counter-IUU

|
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measures, seen through the EU’s trade policy example, lead to un-

developed in the absence of the state (see Ruddle & Satria, 2010).

fair assumptions of the role and function of small-scale fisheries and

But as the inland and coastal waters and the fisheries resources

small-scale fisheries-dependent countries. Third, we reflect on the

within them have been gradually enclosed within (sub)national

growing tendency to frame IUU fishing as “crime” and the effect this

state regulation, small-scale fisheries practices have also been sub-

has on the growing criminalization of small-scale fishers. Finally, we

sumed under state managerial control (sensu Scott, 1998; see also

discuss how a more small-scale fisheries-sensitive approach can be

Bavington, 2010; Butcher, 2004; Campling & Havice, 2014). In the

attained in the global fight against IUU fishing by outlining three

process, fishing activity and tenure arrangements that fall outside

broad strategies.

state control have been made “illegal”—even when there may be
existing rules controlling fishing effort or allocation. For example,

2 | TH E “ L A RG E-S C A LE ” CO N C E P T O F I U U

traditional tenure systems governing coastal fisheries resources in
the Pacific were in some cases weakened and eliminated by the imposition of formal laws by colonial governments (Johannes, 1978;

The concept of “IUU fishing” emerged out of concerns related to in-

see also Chirwa, 1996; Gustave & Borchers, 2008). Such formal

dustrial fishing fleets operating in the high seas—in particular the

proclamations of “illegality” have serious implications for local

longline toothfish fishery in the Antarctic Ocean within the CCAMLR

cultures, livelihoods and economies. If enforced, fishing activity

framework (the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic

can be shut down, informal trade significantly curtailed and so-

Marine Living Resources). 2 From this specific context of the high

cio-cultural linkages between coastal communities eroded (Fabinyi

seas, “illegal,” “unreported” and “unregulated” fishing is now com-

et al., 2014; Ross, Adhuri, Abdurrahim, & Phelan, 2019). The aim

monly used to explain the main drivers of global fisheries decline

here is not to imply that self-governance rules in small-scale fisher-

regardless of the social or ecological context in which these fisheries

ies are necessarily more effective in controlling stock status than

are practiced (Palma, Tsamenyi, & Edeson, 2010). In the process, the

government control. Instead, it highlights the need to recognize

non-differentiation of illegal, unreported and unregulated under the

the empirical reality that diverse forms of management, including

banner of “IUU” “obscures the policy responses required by treating

self-governance, exist and even prevail in small-scale fisheries (e.g.

as one what are really several distinct problems calling for as many

see Foale et al., 2011; Zeller & Pauly, 2019).

distinct solutions” (Serdy, 2011, p. 272). Following this observation,

Moreover, the sharp binary of what is “legal” makes everything

we argue there are at least three ways in which the non-differenti-

else illegal by definition, undermining more nuanced understand-

ated use of “IUU” fishing has negatively affected, and even delegiti-

ings of legality/illegality as a spectrum of beliefs, values and prac-

mized, small-scale fisheries.

tices (Benda-Beckmann, 2002; Nahuelhual, Saavedra, Mellado,

First, the categorization of illegal fishing as a concern of

Vergara, & Vallejos, 2020). As illustrated in the Philippines, the use

the state has tended to ignore the existence of plural rule sys-

of beach seining, while illegal in the eyes of the law, is often tol-

tems governing small-scale fisheries activity (i.e. legal pluralism,

erated by fishers, community members and local-level government

Bavinck, 2005; see also Adhuri, 2013; Foale, Cohen, Januchowski-

officials as compared to more destructive fishing methods such as

Hartely, Wenger, & Macintyre, 2011; Rahman et al., 2017). It is

cyanide or blast fishing (Eder, 2009; see also Bell, Hampshire, &

widely documented that many small-scale fisheries are self-gov-

Topalidou, 2007). It thus appears prudent to understand the sever-

erned through a range of customary rules, most of which were

ity, frequency, magnitude and acceptance of “illegal” activity in de-

2

The origin of the “IUU fishing” concept can be traced to the concerns discussed within
the CCAMLR (the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources). During the 15th Session in 1996, specific concerns about illegal and
unreported fishing were first raised. Illegal fishing, particularly in the longline fishery for
toothfish in the Antarctic Ocean, was identified as a particular challenge. Likewise,
fishing activities of vessels flying the flags of non-CCAMLR members were described as
unregulated fishing, who also provided no reports of their catches from the Convention
area. Since the first formal mention of IUU fishing during the 16th Session of the
CCAMLR in 1997, the concept began to appear regularly at CCAMLR meetings. In 1999,
the term also found its way into meeting reports of the FAO, the International Maritime
Organization, the UN General Assembly and other regional fisheries management
organizations (RFMOs) to refer broadly to a combination of unsustainable fishing
activities by both members and non-members. In FAO, the term IUU fishing was formally
adopted and became a central part of its international fisheries policy at the 23rd Session
of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) in 1999. A series of rapid developments
concretized the IUU fishing notion, including the Rome Declaration on Responsible
Fisheries in 1999 to develop an international plan of action to address IUU fishing as well
as a global review of IUU fishing by FAO (see Bray, 2001). A draft text of “International
Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing” by the FAO Expert Consultation on IUU Fishing was tabled in May 2000,
followed by FAO Technical Consultations on IUU fishing. Finally, the COFI in March 2001
adopted the text of the IPOA-IUU, which was subsequently endorsed by the FAO
Council at its 120th Session in June 2001 (see FAO, 2015; Palma et al., 2010 for more
details).

termining the applicability of IUU-related measures.
Second, unreported fishing refers to the misreporting or non-reporting of relevant information, including the volume and composition of catch and landings, vessel movement and catch location and
vessel registration (Palma et al., 2010; Serdy, 2011; Theilen, 2013).
The failure to collect such information is deemed to undermine
efforts to assess stocks; create and implement harvest strategies;
and eliminate fraudulent practices at sea and the market through
traceability and transparency (Bailey, Bush, Miller, & Kochen, 2016;
Duggan & Kochen, 2016).
Small-scale fisheries are, however, chronically unreported because, unlike industrial fisheries, landing sites are widely distributed,
vessels are small and numerous, and their catches have generally
not been included into national stock assessment and management
methodologies (Duggan & Kochen, 2016; Quetglas et al., 2016). In
addition, the small-scale sector across a number of countries has historically been excluded from reporting requirements either because
of weak state capacity to enumerate these fisheries (Govan, 2014)
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and/or because assumptions made in stock assessments are already

legitimacy of small-scale fisheries. The consequences for small-scale

deemed robust enough for the small-scale sector (Mahon, 1997).

fisheries, though some more than others depending on individual

Though unreported, these fisheries are not necessarily illegal, and

contexts, are that they are not differentiated from industrial fisher-

any distinction of this kind is again lost in the blanket use of “IUU”

ies despite making a distinctly different contribution to both coastal

(see Shajahan, 2012). This conflation of unreported fishing as IUU

economies and overfishing.

fishing, regardless of context or conditions, has led to perverse assumptions around the status of small-scale fisheries. For example,
Watson and Tidd (2018) classify 80% of all non-industrial fisheries
globally from 1950 to 2015 as “IUU” because there was no recov-

3 | TR A D E R E S TR I C TI O N S TO FI G HT I U U
FI S H I N G

erable record of landing. While correct in the sense that this fishing
is not reported, this non-differentiated use of “IUU” delegitimizes

The blanket uptake of “IUU fishing” in international trade regulation

these fisheries with little consideration of their regulatory status,

by major importing markets such as the EU and the US1 holds sig-

local economic importance or contribution to overall fish stock or

nificant risks for small-scale fisheries. Notably, the EU-IUU regula-

habitat status.

tion (EC Reg. No. 1005/2008) is an explicit attempt to incentivize the

Finally, unregulated fishing is perhaps the most ambiguous cate-

governments of fish exporting countries to take action to prevent

gory of “IUU” (Rosello, 2017; Theilen, 2013). Much of this ambiguity

and eliminate IUU fishing conducted in their waters or by their fleets

extends from the IPOA-IUU, which permits certain unregulated fish-

(for more details, see He, 2017; Leroy, Galletti, & Chaboud, 2016; van

ing if it “take[s] place in a manner that is not in violation of applicable

der Marel, 2017; Miller et al., 2014; Rosello, 2017; Sumaila, 2019).

international law and may not require the application of measures”

The EU-IUU regulation does not target specific sectors in isolation—

(FAO, 2001a, p. 3). In other words, a fishery is considered unregu-

whether small-scale or industrial sectors. Having a broad mandate,

lated based on the status of the prevailing national or sub-national

it requires states to implement a catch certification scheme that en-

regulatory system, rather than that fishery's compliance with the

sures that catches are traceable from vessels through the markets,

regulatory system in place (FAO, 2015). This becomes all the more

and compliant to conservation and management measures agreed

problematic when coastal and inland small-scale fisheries are largely

upon for coastal and high seas waters.

unregulated by the state, with de jure open access, in order for small-

Countries not cooperating with the IUU regulation are prohib-

scale fisheries to meet wider societal goals, such as livelihood and

ited from trading fish landed from their waters to the EU or the fish

food security in remote and often poor communities (e.g. India, Sri

caught by vessels flying their flag. Exporting countries must demon-

Lanka, Indonesia and Kiribati; also recreational fisheries in countries

strate continued compliance with the requirements of the IUU reg-

like South Korea).

ulation or bear the opportunity costs of being excluded from the

The lack of explicit government regulation does not necessar-

European Common Market. Non-compliance is initially sanctioned

ily mean there are no well-functioning rules or systems in place. As

with a “yellow card” warning, followed by a “red card” if they are

Arthur (2020, p. 1) notes, “not restricting who can fish may represent

found to be in repeated contravention of the regulation's require-

a viable management option for some small-scale fisheries, partic-

ments (EU-IUU Reg. Article 31[3]). A yellow card requires improve-

ularly where there are migratory fishers, seasonal waterbodies or

ments to be addressed according to an agreed timeline. If these

fluctuating resources.” For example, customary rules regulating local

requirements are not met, a red card is issued, at which time all

access to stocks and habitat, often even adapting to changing cli-

fisheries in that country, irrespective of species and sectors, will be

matic conditions, have been widely shown to function effectively

banned from exporting fish products to the European common mar-

in small-scale fisheries (e.g. Jul-Larsen, Kolding, Overå, Nielsen, &

ket. Since its inception in 2010 until July 2019, the EU issued 25 yel-

Zwieten, 2003; Kolding & van Zwieten, 2011; Ruddle & Satria, 2010;

low cards. Of these, 15 were resolved without further sanctions at

Tezzo, Kura, Baran, & Wah, 2017). In such cases, “unregulated” ap-

time of writing, while six led to a red card being issued (see Figure 1).

pears to be more a matter of weak government recognition of such

The EU’s trade-based control of IUU fishing has had a demon-

customary rules which develop, for example, through social ties

strable impact on both national fisheries management systems and

or co-management (e.g. Alexander, Staniczenko, & Bodin, 2020;

the conduct of fishers. For example, after receiving a yellow card

D’Armengol, Castillo, Ruiz-Mallén, & Corbera, 2018). The policy at-

in 2014 the Philippine government amended the national Fisheries

tention on unregulated fishing may stem from an acknowledgement

Code, leading to stronger penalties for legal violations and a greater

that, despite the presence of official rules, enforcement of small-

emphasis on data collection and monitoring (Republic Act 10654)

scale fisheries is made difficult by either the inadequate functioning

(Espenilla, 2019; Oceana, 2017). Similarly, Thailand revised their

of the state or the inability of the state to cope with distant and/

fisheries legislation and implemented a series of reforms in the moni-

or largely illegible fishing, trade and processing practices (Doddema,

toring and surveillance of fishing vessels in reaction to concerns over

Spaargaren, Wiryawan, & Bush, 2018; Serdy, 2011; Song, Johnsen,

“slave” labour in Thai fishing fleets (Marschke & Vandergeest, 2016),

& Morrison, 2018).

and Sri Lanka and Belize both made reforms to the enforcement

In summary, the non-differentiation of “illegal,” “unreported”
and “unregulated” has the potential to undermine the viability and

of catch documentation (Government of Belize, 2013; Leroy
et al., 2016).

|
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Despite its apparent success and a call to extend such mea-
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small-scale vessels to produce catch documentation (Doddema,

sures to other major import markets (e.g. Sumaila, 2019), we argue

Spaargaren, Wiryawan, & Bush, 2020; Siriraksophon, Kawamura, &

that the issuance of yellow and red cards (inadvertently) has had a

Imsamrarn, 2016). Perhaps more importantly, these informational

disproportionate impact on small-scale fisheries in at least three

demands incur negative material consequences for small-scale fish-

ways.

eries. Greater transparency can engender greater regulatory over-

First, as outlined above, the categorical use of “IUU” overlooks

sight that might constrain their ability to maintain their already often

important differences between small-scale fisheries and industrial

marginal mode of production. Reporting procedures can also be par-

fishing operations. Ignoring these differences can mean that the

ticularly onerous for small-scale fishers for which relatively little

small-scale sector is seen as an easier target for reform than the in-

data are available, especially where management and trading rela-

dustrial sector. Such a scenario has been observed in the case of

tions continue to rely on informal and customary arrangements

Ghana, which received a yellow card from the EU in November 2013

(Steenbergen et al., 2019). In addition, there can be real costs to in-

for, among others, inadequate reliability of MCS systems and catch

crease information provision. As observed in the Philippines after

certification schemes, and poor compliance with RFMO regulations

the EU issued a yellow card (see Fabinyi, Dressler, & Pido, 2019;

(European Commission, 2015). While various legislative reforms

Sari, 2015), the registration of boats, gears and fishers themselves,

were introduced to manage the industrial fleet, in practice, the illegal

as well as upgrading landing sites and training fishers and fishery

use of lights and chemicals by small-scale fishers became a conspicu-

experts, imposes significant extra costs that are not easily

ous object of scrutiny in the name of curbing IUU fishing (Afoakwah,

recuperated.

Osei, & Effah, 2018). Artisanal fishing nets were seized, and spe-

Third, the EU-IUU regulation does not discriminate in terms of

cial courts set up in collaboration with Chief Justice and Attorney

the relative importance that the small-scale sector plays in do-

General's offices to prosecute fishers engaging in IUU fishing, in-

mestic markets. Analysing multi-country fish trade data, Sumaila

cluding small-scale operators (Gyesi, 2019). By treating reforms in

(2019) concludes that small developing countries, such as Cote

the small-scale sector as a means of addressing a yellow card aimed

d’Ivoire, Seychelles and Maldives, would face the highest eco-

at the industrial sector, the Ghanaian authorities have also avoided

nomic risk of being red carded given their high dependence on the

addressing the illegal transshipment behaviour of domestically reg-

EU market, with between 70% and 90% of their catch being sent

istered but largely Chinese-owned and operated industrial fleet (EJF

to the EU. In fact, the “poorest” countries classified as “low-in-

& Hen Mpoano, 2019)—China being an important trade partner and

come countries” (e.g. Liberia, Togo) tend to show the largest share

source of aid. This case shows how the politics of illegal fishing can

of small-scale fisheries within the 25 carded countries (Figure 1).4

create pressure for action that does not address the causes of the

These are countries with arguably the least financial and adminis-

most problematic forms of fishing while tending to opt for a more

trative capacity to make the required changes to fishing and pro-

convenient target.

cessing activities, including access to information and tracking

Second, the EU-IUU regulation stipulates data collection and re-

technologies

and

infrastructure

(e.g.

use

of

Automatic

porting requirements that in turn lead to the “procedural exclusion”

Identification System [AIS] data is biased towards larger vessels in

of small-scale fisheries from markets (Bondaroff, Teale, Reitano, &

upper-middle-income

Werf, 2015; Houssa & Verpoorten, 2015). The wider trend towards

Kroodsma, & Fernandes, 2019).

and

high-income

countries,

Taconet,

information systems encourages fisher enrolment to the EU-IUU

The EU has provided assistance to developing countries to help

regulation, but also enables fishers to comply with private initiatives

them address deficiencies in MCS and legal systems and comply with

such as the “IUU Fishing Index” (Macfadyen, Hosch, Kaysser, &

the requirements of the IUU regulation. However, by neither ac-

Tagziria, 2019) and/or Global Fishing Watch (Kroodsma et al., 2018).

counting for the systematic challenges of implementing IUU-related

Although small-scale fisheries have been given some concession in

regulation in return for market access, nor considering the relative

the design of the EU regulation, resulting in simplified catch certifi-

overall contribution of those countries to I, U or U fishing, the EU

cates for instance,3 small-scale fisheries are nevertheless being facil-

runs the risk of placing a disproportionate burden on small-scale

itated to verify their catch and provide landing documentation for

fishery-dependent countries.5

individual vessels, and in doing so gaining or maintaining access to
export markets (see Doddema et al., 2018; Duggan & Kochen, 2016).
Difficulties with compliance have been noted, such as how to effectively validate the data entered by the captains of fishing vessels
given insufficient logistics and infrastructure available at provincial
landing sites as well as the absence of government rules to oblige
3
The simplified catch certificate is laid down in Article 6 of Commission Regulation
1010/2010, where it stipulates the criteria of a small vessel as follows: (a) with an overall
length of less than 12 m without towed gear; or (b) with an overall length of less than 8
meters with towed gear; or (c) without a superstructure; or (d) of less than measured 20
GT.

4
Proportion of SSF to total fisheries was constructed through: [marine SSF
landings + inland fisheries landings]/[total marine landings + inland fisheries landings], by
using sector disaggregated data of marine landings of the Sea Around Us project (Pauly &
Zeller, 2015) and integrated inland fisheries landing estimates from Funge-Smith (2018).
Number of months subjected to EU carding was derived from the dates that the EU
issued yellow, red or green card (available at IUU Watch, 2019), as at July 2019.
5
For instance, Tsamenyi et al. (2009, p. xv) state that the EU “must acknowledge the
vulnerability of developing countries and the difficulties that they will face in
implementing the [EU trade] regulation. It is essential that developing countries do not,
directly or indirectly, bear a disproportionate burden of global efforts to combat IUU
fishing.”
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F I G U R E 1 Proportion of small-scale fisheries to total fisheries of countries carded by the EU, listed by country income groups. The two
numbers in square bracket denote the number of months a yellow card and red card were issued for, respectively, between 2010 and July
2019. (LIC: low-income countries; LMI: lower-middle-income countries; UMI: upper-middle-income countries; HIC: high-income countries)
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on strengthening management rules and stepping up compliance
levels, to IUU fishing dealt with through criminal-law, facilitated

The non-differentiation of IUU fishing also means that all fisheries,

through intelligence-led policing with a view to prosecution and im-

including small-scale fisheries, are potentially being reframed as sub-

prisonment (Chapsos & Hamilton, 2019; de Coning & Witbooi, 2015;

ject to criminalization. This reframing corresponds with a shift from

Liddick, 2014; Page & Ortiz, 2020; Stølsvik, 2019; UNODC, 2011;

fishing activity being dealt with through administrative-law, focused

Vrancken, Witbooi, & Glazewski, 2019). It expands the scope of IUU
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activity to a far broader set of activities including money laundering,

to whether small-scale fishers engaging in “IUU” activity are in fact in

corruption, human trafficking, slavery and document and customs

control of the criminal organization of that activity; that is, controlling

fraud that in turn expands the potential scope for criminal policing

the means by which the IUU fishing is perpetuated.

and surveillance of fishers in general (Vrancken et al., 2019).

As argued by Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized

There is growing evidence of this shift to associate IUU fishing

Crime (The Global Initiative, 2014), the failure to distinguish be-

with criminal activity in various international fora. IUU fishing now

tween those organizing and those exercising illegal behaviour has

makes up one of five broad areas of environmental crime by the

serious consequences for small-scale fishers. First, there is weak

EU, the Group of Eight (G8) and the United Nations Environment

evidence that the criminalization of IUU fishing has led to the con-

Programme (UNEP) (de Coning, 2016). It was also identified as a new

viction of controlling or organizing illegal behaviour. Instead, it is

trend in crime during the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime

small-scale fishers already exploited in low-income, labour-intensive

Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2010. Aside from INTERPOL,

fishing activity who have been the focus of policing and legal perse-

which is directly involved in cross-border investigations of IUU fish-

cution (Isaacs & Witbooi, 2019; The Global Initiative, 2014). Second,

ing through joint information-gathering and multilateral operations

by not focusing on those organizing illegal fishing, there is height-

among member countries, other major international organizations

ened risk of state-sponsored violence against fishing communities.

have also taken steps to combat IUU-cum-criminal activities in the

For example, criminalizing fishers as “poachers” directly impacts

fisheries sector (e.g. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation

livelihoods and the resilience of communities as well as “exacerbates

and Development [OECD], the African Union and the International

rifts between citizens and the state” (The Global Initiative, 2014, p.

Labour Organisation) (de Coning, 2016; Stølsvik, 2019).

3). It may even bring lethal outcomes as observed from the case of

While the criminalization of IUU has focused mainly on inter-ju-

fishermen being shot dead for “intruding” on newly imposed marine

risdictional fisheries, several countries have also taken action at the

reserves (e.g. Gustave & Borchers, 2008). The consequence is that

national level. For example, Vietnam revised its national fisheries

those who depend on small-scale fisheries bear the burden of stig-

law in 2017 (Law No. 18/2017/QH14) making an extensive range

matization, sanctions and even bodily harm, as the international dis-

of illegal commercial fishing (including failures to keep logbooks

course pushes for the criminalization of IUU fishing.

and non-adherence to RFMO rules) open to criminal prosecution.
In South Africa, Isaacs and Witbooi (2019) report that the Marine
Living Resources Act, the primary legislation addressing the country's marine fisheries, now criminalizes almost all transgressions
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of its provisions and regulations. This has resulted in direct steps
being taken by the government to investigate and prosecute those

As laws and regulations to combat IUU fishing continue to be rolled

suspected of illegal fishing activities. In other countries, such as

out, the risk to small-scale fisheries will continue to grow. Very real

Indonesia and Tanzania, there is also anecdotal evidence that con-

consequences of surveillance and criminalization as well as exclu-

firms the formal criminalization of illegal fishing, including the use of

sion from export trade regardless of their IUU status are already

mobile courts where fishers who violated licensing or gear require-

being observed. At worst, IUU regulation of all kinds will contribute

ments can be charged and sentenced instantly (see “Mobile courts

to the de-legitimization of small-scale fisheries, by framing them as

can curb illegal fishing”, 2019).

inherently ungovernable (i.e. inherently illegal, unregulated and un-

The all-encompassing criminalization of fisheries becomes highly

reported) rather than as a major contributor to coastal food secu-

problematic, however, when extended to small-scale fisheries, where

rity, economies and cultures (Béné, Hersoug, & Allison, 2010; Mills

the categories of legality/illegality are more blurred. Such categories

et al., 2011; Teh & Pauly, 2018). Yet despite the consequences of the

become doubtful when the activity of small-scale fishers “doing what

IUU discourse for small-scale fisheries, we remain optimistic that this

they have always done” (Bell et al., 2007, p. 413) come to be seen as en-

oversight can be rectified. The challenge, we argue, is to rethink how

gaging in new forms of criminally organized illegal fishing operations.

IUU fishing policy and regulation can support a more constructive

As illustrated in the case of West Coast rock lobster in South Africa,

and ultimately more equitable incorporation of small-scale fisheries

organized criminal groups may be entrenched within coastal commu-

in the global fight against IUU fishing. Rethinking how IUU fishing

nities who enrol local fishers with few alternative livelihood opportu-

can work in the interest of small-scale fisheries could start with any

nities to participate in illegal harvesting (Isaacs & Witbooi, 2019). The

combination of the following three strategies (see Figure 2).

criminalization of small-scale fisheries in such contexts is made fur-

First, dedicated provisions could be made in international, regional

ther opaque by the patronage these gangs exercise over fishing com-

and national IUU-related policy and regulation that acknowledge the

munities by, for example, supporting school fees and cash advances

role and importance of small-scale fisheries to food security and local

for food in return for exercising illegal fishing activities (Isaacs, 2011,

economies. Making such provisions would constitute an important

2013; Isaacs & Witbooi, 2019; McMullan & Perrier, 2009). In such a

step in providing an adequate and fair representation of the activities

setting, a clear demarcation of who is part of an organized syndicate

of small-scale fishers. It will also directly help to move beyond the cat-

and who is not becomes ambiguous (see also Chapsos, Koning, &

egorical use of IUU outlined above and instead force policymakers to

Noortmann, 2019). Subsequently, it requires a careful judgement as

be more precise in their use and allocation of illegal, unregulated and
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F I G U R E 2 Three possible strategies
for responsibly incorporating small-scale
fisheries into IUU fishing regulation, and
how they are characterized according
to the degree of reform and the scale of
action [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]

unreported when distinguishing between industrial and small-scale

be to enhance ongoing debates on harmful subsidies at the World

fisheries. More precise language will increase the likelihood of more

Trade Organization, where subsidies may be allowed in support of

contextualized measures and regulation that distinguish the kinds of

“non-IUU”-related small-scale fisheries. Such a flexible and more eq-

small-scale fishery activity that does contribute to stock decline or

uitable strategy would allow each country to determine ambitions

habitat degradation and those activities that do not.

and strategies that meet IUU challenges while considering their own

Some international measures are already making such provi-

political, social and economic contexts. But it would also require in-

sions that are instructive. For instance, the Port State Measures

ternational guidance by the overall framework of the convention.

Agreement makes an exception for small-scale fisheries (e.g. “ves-

The result would be that rather than all countries being forced to

sels engaged in artisanal fishing for subsistence,” see Article 3.1a),

comply with regulations set by a few importing market jurisdictions,

1

and the US Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP), exempts

the global fight against IUU fishing would be made more sensitive to

importers from providing vessel-specific information if the catches

the diverse circumstances faced by countries still largely dependent

are from small-scale vessels (up to 12 m in length or 20 gross tons).

on the small-scale sector.

Further, the SIMP allows reporting to be aggregated for single-col-

Finally, in a more radical move, bespoke mechanisms could be

lection-point, single-calendar-day catches by multiple small-scale

established to counter IUU fishing to deal with the most destructive

fishing vessels, substantially reducing the amount of export docu-

small-scale fishery practices. Despite the high complexity and di-

ments required. Small-scale fisheries would benefit if such excep-

versity of small-scale fisheries, attempts that rely on greater self-re-

tions were extended to the EU-IUU regulation, as well as private

porting and control over IUU activity in and by small-scale fisheries

initiatives such as the IUU Fishing Index and Global Fishing Watch—

seem plausible. For instance, using an increasing range of relatively

all of which risk making generalized assumptions of national-level

inexpensive digital sensing technologies on vessels and landing

performance that target national governments rather than allow

sites, small-scale fishers are already demonstrating their legal, re-

space for differentiation between fleets or sectors (see Taconet

ported and even regulated conduct (Bush et al., 2017; Starr, 2016).

et al., 2019). Better representation in such fora by small-scale fish-

Key to such a system is not only the incorporation of these technol-

eries organizations would also better ensure they receive due rec-

ogies into the practices of fishers (Doddema et al., 2018), but also

ognition of how international IUU policies affect their conduct and

control over the data and information collected (Bush et al., 2017;

performance.

Duggan & Kochen, 2016). Fishers, governments and buyers will

Second, the global community may consider utilizing a multi-

need to view the collection and presentation of this information as

lateral framework whereby IUU fishing control targets take into

both a credible and legitimate representation of small-scale fisher-

account differences in the countries’ economic status, administra-

ies behaviour. The merit of such a system is that it would reverse

tive and technical capacity and also in the composition and nature

the “burden of proof” placed on small-scale fishers to prove their

of their fishing industries. While the idea of non-uniform targets is

activities are non-IUU. Necessary conditions for such a shift to be

antithetical to the current EU- and US-IUU regulations by which all

a realistic option for small-scale fishers include advances in sensing

countries are to be placed on a “level playing field,” the practice of

technology that are sensitive to the activities of fishers (Toonen &

common but differentiated responsibilities is in fact well established

Bush, 2020) in combination with NGOs or the private sector fulfilling

in related international fora, particularly in the domain of climate

the role of data collectors and technology service providers (Bush

change mitigation via the “Nationally Determined Contributions”

et al., 2017). Recognition and support by national governments is

scheme under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

also needed to secure small-scale fisher rights over the data and re-

(Mbeva & Pauw, 2016). One potential pathway, for instance, could

sources on which they report, and importing states to recognize the
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credibility of market claims made by these fishing communities—

funding support from an Australian Research Council DECRA

much as they do the information coming from organizations like

Project [DE200100712]. A. Song was also supported by the CGIAR

Global Fishing Watch. While currently only at the ideational stage,

Research Program on Fish Agri-Food Systems (FISH). Thoughtful

there are precedents from which we can learn. For example, partic-

comments of two anonymous reviewers and collegial feedback of

ipatory guarantee systems in organic agriculture work on the basis

Jeppe Kolding, Paul van Zwieten, Merle Sowman, Moenieba Isaacs

of social control generated through local ownership of the terms

and N. Nilmawati were highly valuable in improving the manuscript.

of surveillance. This has facilitated localized system of assurance

Any errors that remain are those of the authors.

and verification, helping to recognize context-specific systems as
credible and legitimate (see Loconto & Hatanaka, 2018). Hence, this

DATA AVA I L A B I L I T Y S TAT E M E N T

innovative model could offer more sensitive and effective means of

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available

deterring unauthorized and ecologically harmful small-scale fishing

in Sea Around Us at www.seaaroundus.org (Pauly & Zeller, 2015)

practices.

and

These three strategies provide a starting point for further

in

FAO

at

www.fao.org/3/ca0388en/CA0388EN.pdf

(Funge-Smith, 2018).

debate over the current role of and the potential alternatives to
global IUU regulations. All three strategies recognize the need to
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scale fishers in any given context. It is, however, more likely that
a combination of these strategies will be needed to overcome the
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